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Abstract 
 
As the IoT ecosystem becoming more and more mature, hardware and software vendors are trying 
create new value by connecting all kinds of devices together via IoT. IoT devices are usually equipped 
with sensors to collect data, and the data collected are transmitted over the air via different kinds of 
wireless connection. To extract the value of the data collected, the data owner may choose to seek for 
third-party help on data analysis, or even of the data to the public for more insight. In this scenario it 
is important to protect the released data from privacy leakage. Here we propose that differential 
privacy, as a de identification technique, can be a useful approach to add privacy protection to the data 
released, as well as to prevent the collected from intercepted and decoded during over-the-air 
transmission. A way to increase the accuracy of the count queries performed on the edge cases in a 
synthetic database is also presented in this research. 
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Abstrak 
 
Sebagai ekosistem IOT menjadi lebih dan lebih dewasa, vendor hardware dan software berusaha 
menciptakan nilai baru dengan menghubungkan semua jenis perangkat bersama melalui IOT. 
Perangkat IOT biasanya dilengkapi dengan sensor untuk mengumpulkan data, dan data yang 
dikumpulkan ditransmisikan melalui udara melalui berbagai jenis koneksi nirkabel. Untuk 
mengekstrak nilai data yang dikumpulkan, pemilik data dapat memilih untuk meminta bantuan dari 
pihak ketiga dalam analisis data, atau bahkan data kepada publik untuk wawasan yang lebih dalam. 
Dalam skenario ini penting untuk melindungi data yang dirilis dari kebocoran privasi. Di sini kami 
mengusulkan bahwa privasi diferensial, sebagai teknik identifikasi de, dapat menjadi pendekatan 
yang berguna untuk menambah perlindungan privasi data yang dirilis, serta untuk mencegah diambil 
dan diterjemahkan selama transmisi over-the-air. Sebuah cara untuk meningkatkan akurasi query 
count dilakukan pada kasus tepi dalam database sintetis juga disajikan dalam penelitian ini. 
 
Kata Kunci: privasi differensial, internet of things, jaringan sensor 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
As the IoT ecosystem becomes more and more 
mature in recent years, hardware and software 
vendors are trying to create new value by 
connecting all kinds of devices together via IoT. 
One of the primary functions of an IoT device is 
to collect and transfer data using equipped 
sensors. Rapid and enormous data collection has 
been happening in the past years on PC and 
mobile phones. According to IBM during the last 
few years 2.5 billion gigabytes of high-velocity 
data, such as social media posts, information 
gathered from sensors and medical devices, 
videos and transaction records, are created in a 
variety of forms every day, and the rise of the IoT 
devices in numbers will cause the quantity of data 
collected each day to skyrocket. Gartner1 predicts 
that in 2016 there’re already 6.4 billion IoT 
devices, and the number will be tripled in 2020, 
making it 20.8 billion. 
 IoT devices possess very different qualities 
than a PC or mobile phone. First, they’re often 
deployed in large number: in the future we might 
have several wearable devices per person, as well 
as multiple IoT-enabled electronics in a house-
hold. Second, a lot of IoT devices will be deploy-
ed outdoors, and those devices will be vulnerable 
to physical hacking, and the transmitted data 
                                                 
1 http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/3165317, 
retrieved on Jan. 26th, 2017 
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Figure 1. Relaying data through a series of Bluetooth 
beacons 
 
might be intercepted, causing every kind of 
possibility of privacy leakage. Last, IoT devices 
usually possess very limited storage and comput-
ing resource, making it difficult to use advanced 
encryption schemes to protect data storage and 
transmission. 
 De-identification techniques can be an effec-
tive alternative to deal with privacy preserving 
data transmission and analysis in for IoT. Existing 
de-identification methods such as K-anonymity 
and its derivatives, and differential privacy-comp-
liant mechanisms consumes relatively small reso-
urce while providing data privacy. In this paper 
we’ll first describe a field test we’ve done at a 
local theme park, utilizing a custom-built Blue-
tooth network and proximity tags to collect spatio-
temporal data of the visitors, and we’ll discuss 
how we can remove the sensitive attributes from 
the data while preserving its statistical utility, so 
that we can release the data to a third-party for 
further analysis without revealing privacy infor-
mation. After coping with the problem of privacy 
preserved IoT data release, we’ll take a brief look 
at a current option to propose how we can use de-
identification techniques to protect data transmis-
sion. 
 
2. Methods 
 
Collection of Spatio-Temporal Data from a 
Custom Bluetooth Sensor Network 
 
Ways to collect spatio-temporal data 
With the emergence of wearable devices and 
sensor technology, there have been plenty 
attempts to collect and analyze spatio-temporal 
data. The most common used technologies to 
retrieve positional information are still GPS and 
Wifi [1-4]. Recently Bluetooth has become a 
viable choice to provide positioning service, 
especially in an indoor scenario. Typically the 
Bluetooth beacons are configured to send out 
simple ID information. When installed its physical 
location will be recorded to a database on a 
central server or a small local database that’s 
attached to an mobile APP. Whenever a mobile 
device gets near the Bluetooth beacon and 
receives the ID information broadcasted by the 
Bluetooth beacon, it will match the ID 
information against the data stored in a server or 
local database on the mobile APP and react 
accordingly. Recently researchers have been 
trying to get more precise positional information 
out of Bluetooth beacons by taking Bluetooth 
signal strength into account and/or combine 
information from multiple beacons [5]. Another 
approach, though, is to get positional information 
via “crowd sensing”. Jamil et. Al. [3] had an 
attempt to combine mobile phones with Bluetooth 
proximity tags to rebuild the traces of visitors. 
 
A custom solution to collect data in a wireless 
Internet-less environment 
As mentioned, the most common usage of 
Bluetooth beacons is to use them as broadcasting 
stations. But since Bluetooth specification 
actually allows a beacon to work in scan and 
broadcasting mode, it is possible to relay limited 
information between Bluetooth beacons, while 
scanning for Bluetooth proximity tags nearby 
back and forth. This way the beacons can collect 
the ID information sent by Bluetooth proximity 
tags and relay them through a series of beacons. 
At the end of the beacon chain we can setup a PC 
as a Bluetooth network-to-Internet gateway to 
relay collected information to a remote cloud 
server for data storage and analysis, as in Figure 
1. 
 The “Bluetooth Gateway” is a PC bor Server 
Jonnected to the Internet with a Bluetooth Inter-
face, and each Bluetooth beacon should be placed 
within the broadcasting range of the next and 
previous Bluetooth beacons. The Bluetooth bea-
cons are programmed to carry custom payload, 
enabling them to do two-way communication in 
the following fashion: 
 
Upstream communication 
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In the connected Bluetooth network it’s possible 
for a beacon to send data to the gateway PC and 
even to the Internet when needed. The use of 
custom payload enables arbitrary data to be rela-
ed all the way to the Bluetooth gateway for further 
processing. The data are Bluetooth mostly device 
IDs, but it’s possible to send control codes too 
when needed. 
 
Downstream communication 
Information regarding all Bluetooth beacons was 
aggregated at the Bluetooth gateway, making it 
possible to send control codes downstream to a 
particular beacon. For example, the gateway PC 
can send a command to change the scan interval 
to a particular Bluetooth beacon to change its 
behavior. It is also possible to send application 
related information such as a short message or a 
URL pointer to all the Bluetooth or mobile phones 
near a particular beacon. 
 
Power efficiency of Bluetooth beacons 
To enable easy deployment and allow Bluetooth 
beacons to run on batteries for extended period of 
time, scanning interval of the custom-built Blue-
tooth beacons were configured to rest for 15 
seconds after 5 seconds of scanning and Broad-
casting. Coupled with the clocked switch which 
only turns on Bluetooth beacons during the work 
hours, a Bluetooth beacon can run for 72 days 
without batteries changed with 2x 3000mAh 
batteries installed. Please note that the two-way 
network is not suitable for real time communi-
cation. The beacons are configured to scan peri-
dically. Buffering and confirmation mechanism 
has been designed very carefully to ensure the 
reliability of data transmission, and the time 
required for the packets to travel to the destination 
is long and may vary. In our experiments the 
transfer time can be as long as 1 minute when the 
beacon chain is long. 
 In past researches Internet connections are 
required to send the collected positional infoma-
tion to a remote server. For example, if we want to 
collect spatio-temporal information of visitors in a 
theme park for optimizing the visiting experience, 
the theme park will have to make visitors install 
mobile APPs and configure properly and provide 
wireless Internet access for them if they do not 
have it themselves. It could be expensive  and  uh-
realistic  for  a  theme  park  do create those infra-
structures or to expect every visitor to have an 
Internet connection subscription. By using a 
custom Bluetooth beacon network described here 
we’ll give proximity tags to visitors (Bluetooth 
bracelets or stickers), and setup beacons along the 
popular paths. As in Figure 1 the beacons can then 
repay detected  ID information all the way to the 
Internet. This is made possible by the utilization 
of the CC2541 SoC’s programmable chip from TI, 
which is used to create a custom protocol to relay 
information through a series of Bluetooth bea-
cons. A local theme park called “Little Ding Dong 
science theme park” agreed to let the research 
team setup more than 50 beacons around the 
theme park. The devices we used to setup this 
experiment includes: 
 
Custom-made Bluetooth beacons 
Inside the beacon container Three are four som-
ponents: (1) A programmable SoC from Texas 
Instruments with 8051 ALU and integrated Blue-
tooth functions, (2) An antena, (3) A waterproof 
case for reliable operation indoor/outdoor, (4) A 
pair of batteries that allows the beacon to work for 
several weeks when fully charged 
 Utilizing the SoC’s programmability, we 
were able to implement some of the key features 
of the system: (1) Change signal scanning / 
transmitting interval to increase power efficiency: 
to increase power efficiency, the interval of 
scanning time of Bluetooth beacons can be tuned. 
Extensive experiments were performed for us to 
learn about the optimal parameters that balance 
energy and data transferring efficiency. Based on 
the experiment results we configure the beacons 
to scan or broadcast for 5 seconds and sleep for 15 
seconds. The beacons will also be configured to 
 
 
Figure 2. Custom made Bluetooth beacon 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Bluetooth bracelet from Xiaomi Technology 
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run for 8 hours a day. A beacon equipped with 2 
3000mAh batteries can run for 72 days nonstop 
using this setting. This enables fast deployment 
and easy maintenance for the Bluetooth beacon 
Networks, (2) Enabling two-way communication: 
the beacons are programmed to relay “upstream” 
and “downstream” data. For instance, identifi-
cation information of Bluetooth bracelets collect-
ed by the beacons will be sent “upstream” to the 
gateway PC (described later), and will be relay to 
cloud server thereafter. The gateway PC can send 
commands “downstream” to a particular beacon 
through a predefined path. Please note that, to 
accommodate the energy efficiency arrangements, 
the two-way communication will not be real-time 
and will inevitably introduce latency in data 
transmission. 
 
Sending out identification info: Bluetooth 
bracelet / proximity tag to send 
Bluetooth bracelets from Xiaomi technology 
are affordable and serve the purpose well. 
Around 50 units were given to the visitors 
when they enter the theme park, and the 
bracelets were returned when they leave the 
theme park in exchange for coupons that offer 
a discount when they visit the theme park next 
time. 
 
Gateway PC with Internet connection and 
Bluetooth connectivity 
There’ll be a PC with Bluetooth connectivity and 
Internet connection at the end of the Bluetooth 
beacon chain. It will act as a gateway to enable 
the Bluetooth network to exchange information 
with the Internet. 
 
Remote cloud server 
To analyze the data collected effectively, a remote 
cloud server with adequate processing power and 
storage will serve as a storage and data analysis 
platform.  The  web  server  will  provide  HTTP 
REST-based API to process data storage requests 
and attraction recommendation information to 
users. Route prediction algorithm will also be 
implemented on the web server. 
 
Setting up the beacons 
More than 50 beacons were setup in the theme 
park to collect spatio-temporal data of the visitors. 
Since we want to deploy as few beacons as 
possible, the beacons were tested and it is 
confirmed that their range of transmission is 15- 
20 meters. A person will be detected by nearby 
beacons, and since we’re not utilizing signal 
strength data at this time, placing beacons farther 
apart will help to reduce redundant detection of 
visitors from the same beacons. Also since the 
beacons are placed mostly outdoor, it is important 
that there’re clear path between beacons for 
Bluetooth signal to be transmitted reliably (no 
walls present to reflect the signals). In Figure 4, it 
is shown that the beacons often have to be placed 
higher above the ground to ensure that there’re 
clear paths between the beacons. 
It is worth noting that there’re Bluetooth 
beacons on the market that can run for years on 
battery, but this is not the case in our study. The 
custom-built beacons do not just sending out ID 
information, instead they keeps switching Pet-
ween scanning and broadcasting mode, and have 
to buffer data before relaying them to the other 
beacons. By carefully tuning the switching 
interval they still manage to last 8 to 9 weeks 
before the batteries have to be replaced. 
 
3. Results and Analysis 
 
Following the BLE specification a Bluetooth pac-
ket can only be 32-byte in length, and we have to 
design the transmission data format around this 
restriction. To ease power consumption, the bea-
cons will detect at most 28 visitors’ proximity tag 
at each round of scanning, and the data will be 
squeezed into a single packet and transmitted to 
the next beacon in line. As illustrated in Fig 1. the 
data will be transmitted along the chain of 
Bluetooth beacons, all the way to the gateway and 
eventually to a remote server in the cloud. A 
MySQL server is installed on the cloud server to 
store the collected data. We setup a data schema to 
store such data as n Table 1. 
 
 
Figure 4. Physical placement of Bluetooth beacons 
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From this data we can perform some analysis 
on the users’ visiting behavior. For example, we 
can reconstruct the route of a particular visitor 
using the data (Figure 5.), or draw a histogram to 
show which attractions in the theme park is most 
visited. 
 More analysis can be performed on the raw 
data to gain more insight regarding how the visi-
ors visit the theme park. However, sometimes the 
data collector doesn’t necessarily have the ability 
do make the most out of the data, hence the need 
to share those data with a third-party or even 
release it to the public for further analysis. In this 
case adequate privacy must be ensured, or the 
release of such data can violate privacy regula-
tions. We’ll discuss how we can protect raw data 
before release in the following paragraph. 
 
 
Ensuring Privacy When Releasing Data to a 
Third Party or the General Public 
 
It is expected the number of IoT devices will grow 
rapidly in the coming years. IoT devices not only 
possess processing power and storage capability, 
but are also equipped with sensors and actuators. 
Massive amount of data will be collected by the 
sensors, and then transferred and stored. Event-
ually they have to be analyzed to generated value. 
To ensure privacy of released data, there have 
been some developed methodology trying to 
achieve this goal, and those techniques are often 
labeled as “data de-identification”. The more 
mentioned ones includes K-anonymity [6] and its 
derivatives[7,8], differential privacy [16], and 
other attempts from statistical discipline [9]. Due 
to its deployment by major companies such as 
Apple2 and Google, here we’ll discuses difteri-
ential privacy as a potential solution to ensure 
privacy on IoT data release. It is worth noting  
that  all  kinds  of  data  de-indentification techni-
ques so far have to face the problem of privacy-
                                                 
2 Andy Greenberg, Apple’s ‘Differential Privacy’ 
is about collecting your data, butyou’re your data, 
https://www.wired.com/2016/06/apples-
differential-privacy-collecting-data/, retrived on 
Feb. 6th, 2017.   
utility tradeoff. The more a data set is processed 
extensively to hide all the sensitive information, 
the more decrease in data utility can be expected. 
 
Differential Privacy 
Differential Privacy is first proposed by [16], with 
a provable definition of privacy. The idea is that 
when one perform a query on a data set (e.g. 
count number of the entries that fits a set of 
criterions), the result will be randomized so that 
the result would not be significantly different 
whether a particular record presents in the data set 
or not. The most widely known definition is as 
below: 
 
Definition 1 [16]. A randomized κ function gives 
ε-differential privacy if for all data sets D1 and 
D2 differing on a t most one element, and all S ⊆ 
Range(κ), 
 
𝐏𝐫[𝒌(𝑫𝟏) ∈ 𝑺] ≤ 𝐞𝐱𝐩(𝝐) 𝒙 𝐏𝐫[𝒌(𝑫𝟏)
∈ 𝑺] … 
(1) 
 
The probability is taken is over the coin tosses of 
k. 
 
The single record that is different in D1 and 
D2, can cause privacy leak if the value is vastly 
different from the other values in the data set. For 
example, if there’s a millionaire in the area, by 
TABLE 1 
COLLECTED DATA ATTRIBUTES 
Data Note 
Beacon ID Which beacon detected this 
bracelet 
Bracelet ID Which bracelet was 
detected 
Timestamp The time that this data is 
written to database 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Reconstruction of route for a particular visitor 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Reconstruction of route for a particular visitor 
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looking at the average income of a data set it 
could be easy to tell if this person’s income is 
present in the data set or not. So when we decide 
how much “noise” we want to add to the query 
result we must take this into account. 
 
Definition 2 [16]. For f: D → Rk, the sensitivity of 
is 
 
∆𝒇 =  𝐦𝐚𝐱
𝑫𝟏,𝑫𝟐
‖𝒇(𝑫𝟏) − 𝒇(𝑫𝟐)‖𝟏 … (2) 
 
By withdrawing each record from the data 
set and calculate the query result on the remaining 
data entries, we can identify the maximum poss-
ible difference the absence of an data entry with 
extreme value can produce, and take it into 
account when we decide how much “noise” we 
should add to a query result to ensure differential 
privacy. There are some “randomized functions” 
that fits this definition, but the most commonly 
used one is Laplace mechanism. 
 
Theorem 1. For f: D → Rk, the mechanism Kf that 
adds independently generated noise with 
distribution Lap(∆f /ϵ) to each of the j output 
terms enjoys ϵ–differential privacy [16]. 
 
According to theorem 1, on query function f 
the privacy mechanism K responds with equa-
tion(3). 
 
𝒇(𝑿) + (𝑳𝒂𝒑(∆𝒇/𝝐))𝒌 (3) 
 
will make the query results returned satisfy ϵ–diff-
erential privacy. 
By adding “noise” to query results, we hope 
to prevent an advisory from identifying a person 
by conducting similar queries on a data set. 
However it is worth noting that by making the 
same query over and over again the advisory may 
still learn the real value of a query overtime, so 
differential privacy it is still needed to limit the 
query number of a particular person. This is often 
referred to as “privacy budget.” Also one can 
always choose a larger ϵ to make the noise 
smaller, but this will result in higher disclosure 
risk. 
 
Differential Privacy-Compliant Synthetic 
Database 
As we are trying to deal with the problem of data 
release to a third party, the query-based version of 
differential privacy does not really suit our needs. 
[16] also addressed the issue of “non-interactive 
differential privacy” and proposed that a synthetic 
dataset can be generated from the results of a 
series of counting queries performed on the source 
data. Essentially, one can first identify all the 
possible value combinations of the attributes in a 
data set, and count the occurrence of each 
instance. According to Definition 2. the sensitivity 
of count queries is a fixed “1”, as when we 
remove or add a data entry to a data set, the result 
of counting query will be at most “1”. This makes 
the calculation of sensitivity extremely simple. 
There are several ways suggested by [16] to 
generate synthetic data set from counting query 
results, and below we will describe two of the 
three approaches she recommended. 
The first approach is to simply add Laplace 
noise to each of these counting results, and rebuild 
a data set from those counting information. Since 
TABLE 2 
THE ORIGINAL DATA SET 
Age Height Weight Income TRV HTN DGF 
64 159 66 39 11 0 0 
53 178 78 39 13 0 0 
53 168 61 35 9 0 0 
57 172 78 50 12 0 1 
64 173 53 35 8 0 0 
 
TABLE 3 
THE SYNTHETIC DATA SET 
Age Height Weight Income TRV HTN DGF 
66.5 165.5 71.5 27.83 4.5 0 1 
47.5 171.5 77.5 78.44 36.5 0 0 
55.5 168.5 79.5 54.34 51.5 0 0 
54.5 142.5 87.5 90.49 17.5 1 1 
61.5 169.5 96.5 91.7 34.5 0 1 
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the synthetic data set is built from a series of 
counting query results that is protected by diff-
erential privacy, the data set should preserve 
privacy well. However, the number of count 
queries that needs to be done using approach can 
be excessive large, thus if the source data set is 
large with multiple attributes and value variation, 
the calculation time needed will be excessively 
large. Also although the noise added to each cell 
of this “contingency table” is relatively small, any 
query for a marginal (aggregate counting queries 
that fits certain conditions) can be too large for the 
result to be useful. 
The second approach proposed by [16] is to 
produce some subset of the “contingency table”, 
which are called “marginal tables”, and to connect 
them together via probabilistic inference mecha-
nism. Some of the attempts of this approach are 
PrivBayes [10] and DPTable [11], and in this 
research we use the latter and improve it with 
ways to improve accuracy without sacrificing 
privacy, which we’ll describe later. Here we’ll 
first describe a the steps involved in DPTable to 
generate a synthetic data set that can preserve 
most of the statistical properties of the original 
data set [12]: (1) Calculating the pair wise mutual 
information value between attributes. When 
mutual information value exceeds a certain preset 
threshold the relationship between the attributes 
will be preserved in the following process. Noise 
will be added to the mutual information calcu-
lated. (2) Based on step 1. Dependency graph will 
be constructed. The graph will also be “triangula-
ted” for further processing. (3) The dependency 
graph will be converted to a junction tree, upon 
which marginal tables will be built. (4) Noise will 
be added to the marginal in the marginal tables. 
(5) The marginal tables as a whole will act as a 
joint distribution from which new dataset can be 
synthesized. (6) The data user will then be able to 
sample arbitrary number of data rows from the 
joint distribution. 
To test DPTable, we made an artificial data 
set with columns age, height, weight, income, 
travel, high blood pressure (binary flag) and 
diabetes (binary flag) attributes. The data set has 
100,000 rows. For reference the first 5 rows of the 
original data set is as Table 2, and the first 5 rows 
of the synthetic data set is as Table 3. 
Please note that Table 3 was not “converted” 
from Table 2. As described in the step-by-step of 
DPTable, the DPTable mechanism uses the infor-
mation in Table 2. To build a joint distribution, 
and then samples data from the joint distribution 
to build Table 3. To compare the statistical pro-
perties of the original data set and the synthetic 
data set, we calculate the average and standard 
deviation of each attributes in the table for a rough 
comparison. Please note that the attribute “HTN” 
and “DGF” are binary attributes, so in the “avera-
ge” column we show the counts of positive (“1”) 
value in those attributes. 
In Table 4 we can see that the difference 
between the average value of INCOME and TRV 
is larger at around 8% and 31% respectively. For 
other attributes the difference in average value is 
quite small. For the binary attribute counts, the 
synthetic data produces 26% error for HTN and 
4% error for DGF respectively. Overall the avera-
ge values of different attributes are preserved 
quite well in the synthetic data set. For standard 
deviation the error for most attributes are signi-
ficantly higher. Please note, though, this synthetic 
data set is generated using a small ϵ parameter at 
0.01, which means that privacy is very well-
protected. If one wishes to favor precision over 
privacy protection, he or she can always select a 
larger ϵ. 
 
Use “K-aggregation” to improve the privacy-
utility tradeoff in differential privacy compliant 
synthetic data 
Besides tuning the ϵ parameter, researchers are 
actually trying to find ways to improve the techni-
ques to improve privacy without sacrificing utility 
or vice versa. For example [13] states that by pre-
TABLE 4 
A COMPARISON BETWEEN ORIGINAL AND SYNTHETIC DATA 
 Average Standard Deviation 
 Original Synthetic Original Synthetic 
Age 53.32771 52.99481 7.804086 7.670179 
Height 168.8197 165.9513 7.972777 13.30099 
Weight 77.05943 77.77396 7.718009 10.98742 
Income 71.91315 78.20495 25.18623 31.03803 
TRV 26.43248 34.69463 11.68337 16.89114 
HTN(+) 22187  28072  
DGF(+) 28536  29900  
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process the dataset using k-anonymity, the amount 
of noise addition can be reduced to achieve the 
same privacy in differential privacy, improving 
accuracy without sacrificing privacy. We exami-
ned the procedure and results of DPTable care-
fully, and here we’ll discuss about the ways to 
improve data utility -- K-aggregation [12]. 
For data that is normally distributed, there 
are always fewer counts in extreme cases. For 
example, people that are extremely tall or short 
are tend to be small in number and people with 
more average height would be large in number in 
a normal distributed data set. As specified pre-
viously to apply differential privacy to a tabular 
data set we first convert to a series of “marginal 
tables”, and then start to add fixed amount of 
noise to each of the counting query results, and 
this make it obvious that, proportionally, the mar-
ginal (count queries) with fewer count will be 
influenced by the noise added much more than the 
marginal with larger counts. Since the marginal at 
the edge of the data set contains so much noise it 
VALUE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
COUNT 1 2 2 4 5 8 10 9 7 3 1 1 
↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ 
VALUE 1~3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10~12 
COUNT 5 4 5 8 10 9 7 5 
 
Figure 7. Procudure of K-aggregtion when k = 4 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Error % is larger at the edge of a normally distributed dataset due to fewer data counts. 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Error percentage variation for the attribute “Weight” with K-aggregation, k=200. 
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becomes much less precise and, with low utility. 
To cope with this problem the research team 
came up with a method to preprocess data called 
“K-aggregation”. The steps of this method are as 
the following: Step 1: Two parameters will have 
to be set in advance. First a threshold will need to 
be chosen to examine the maximum acceptable 
error percentage between original dataset and 
synthetic dataset. Parameter k can be calculated 
from the maximum acceptable error percentage as 
stated in previous paragraph. Step 2: After the 
parameter has been chosen, the original dataset 
will be put through the DPTable process, from 
which the synthetic dataset will be generated.  
Step 3: Synthetic dataset will be compared to the 
original. If the maximum error across all possible 
attribute values between the counts in original and 
synthetic dataset is larger than the error threshold 
defined in step 1, we will proceed to step 3. Other-
wise the synthetic dataset is accepted as usable. 
Step 4: Since the error is larger than the threshold, 
we assume that the data value count at the “edge” 
of the dataset needs to be aggregated to increase 
due to normal distribution. We will scan the data-
base from the largest and smallest data value and 
aggregating the counts until the accumulate count 
exceeds k. In the original table those data value 
will be replaced with a new value calculated from 
the weighted mean from the data value. Step 5: If 
there are multiple attributes presents, step 1~4 can 
be iterated through all the attributes. 
Please take Figure 7 as an example. The 
algorithm start to scan data from the two sides of 
the data set, and if the count of a certain value is 
below the threshold set, it will be combined with 
the count of the next value. After the threshold 
was reached the older values will be combined as 
a weighted new value. After K-aggregation the 
extremely low counts were combined and more 
precise counts are possible. To get an idea about 
the effect of K-aggregation, we also use the 
artificial data set as an example. In Figure 8, the 
top chart gives us an idea about the higher error % 
that the edge cases produce, and it is clear that the 
cases at the center of the chart produce much 
lower error %. The chart at the bottom represent 
shows the data entry count for each weight value. 
We process the attribute “weight” in this data 
set with K-aggregation and have the threshold set 
to k = 200. In Figure 9. We can see that when the 
data attribute is pre-processed with K-aggre-
gation, the error % of the counts toward the edge 
of the data set remains at a much lower level. And 
in the chart at the bottom we can see that at the 
edge of the chart the counts are aggregated and 
given a new value from weighted average of the 
original values. 
To sum it up, K-aggregation can be used to 
reduce the error % at the edge of a DPTable 
processed data set, and this also applies to tabular-
formatted IoT data sets. 
 
Differential privacy as an option to transfer 
IoT data securely  
 
Besides releasing sensitive data with privacy 
protection, differential privacy can also be used to 
transfer data securely. IoT devices collect infor-
mation from all kinds of information and send 
them through Wifi information to remote servers, 
so it is always possible that someone intercepts 
those information. If the purpose of data trans-
mission is for further aggregated analysis, differ-
ential privacy can come in handy. 
 Google RAPPOR [14] use differential priva-
cy as a provable mechanism to protect the privacy 
of transmitted data. When a value is to be trans-
mitted by RAPPOR, its true value will first be 
converted to binary format, and then passed 
through a bloom filter. After that the value will 
then be randomized but “memorized”, so that 
when the value is sent again in the future, this 
particular randomized value will always represent 
the same value. And lastly before the values were 
sent to a remote server the value is randomized 
again. The remote server will aggregate all those 
data received and perform statistical estimation 
regarding how many times a particular string is 
received. Following this process, one can send 
carefully randomized information to a remote 
server for statistical analysis without worrying 
someone intercepts the data sent. As there are no 
encryption or decryption involved, there is no risk 
of leaking a key to an advisory. There’re also 
following up works on RAPPOR to eliminate the 
need of having to build a dictionary first before 
data transmission and decoding [15]. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
During the past 10 years research of data 
anonymity/de-identification has been progress 
steadily. K-anonymity and differential privacy 
have been examined extensively to gauge their 
usefulness in a real world scenario, and the latter 
has started to be used in some main stream 
consumer products. In this research we introduced 
how de-identification techniques can be used for 
privacy preserve data release and data trans-
mission in an IoT setting. Those techniques can 
also be used for non IoT purposes, but de-identi-
fication techniques, due to its lower requirement 
for processing power than some of the more 
sophisticated encryption/decryption schemes, are 
especially suitable for IoT applications. 
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